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Online Music Sharing in a Global
Economy: The U.S. Effort to Command (or
Survive) the Tidal Wave
Eliza Shardlow Clark*
INTRODUCTION
For many recent college graduates, the soundtrack to the
college experience was broadcast from a personal computer.
Napster was undoubtedly a prevalent cultural force on many
college, as well as high school campuses, and its users rarely
questioned the appropriateness of their habit. Many students
used Napster with the same frequency as their e-mail services.
Some enthusiasts may have realized that what they were doing
was morally questionable, but most saw the service as a way to
collect more music than they would ever be willing to pay for, or
as a way to "audition" new artists before purchasing their CDs.
With the boom of the Internet in the early 1990s, download-
ing a five minute song could take up to several hours.1 Then, in
1999, a college student named Shawn Fanning developed a
peer-to-peer file sharing system, Napster, which used the faster
MP3 format.2 By 2002, laptop stereos were the norm on college
campuses,3 and at its peak, Napster enrolled an estimated sev-
J.D. Candidate 2005, University of Minnesota Law School.
1. Stacy Berger, The Use of the Internet to "Share" Copyrighted Material and
its Effect on Copyright Law, 3 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 92, 92 (2001).
2. Id.; see also Peter Brown, The Fight's Just Starting, 23 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 9,
2000, at A16 (Col. 1); Michael S. Mensik & Jeffrey C. Groulx, From the Lightweight
'Rio' Flows Heavyweight Battle: Two-ounce Device that Can Play Music Files
Downloaded from the Net Sparks a Dispute for Control Over Digital Music Distribu-
tion, 21 NAT'L L.J., Dec. 14, 1998, at B5 (Col. 2).
3. Heather Nehila, International Copyright Law: Is it Music to American
Ears?, 16 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 199, 199 (2002); see also Stephen W. Webb,
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enty million users.4 Currently, opposing societal views of the
appropriateness of Napster-spinoff usage continue to spark de-
bate. 5 The courts, global trade organizations, and music indus-
try, however, have cracked down significantly since Napster's
unrestrained, explosive inception, and have utilized a variety of
different tactics in their efforts to quell music-sharing's popular-
ity.6
Music-sharing is not just a domestic problem. Performers
and producers of music in all nations will benefit from tighter
copyright controls. Moreover, the international nature of the
Internet makes it imperative that any solution to the music-
sharing problem be a truly global solution.
This Note highlights some of the legal inadequacies of cur-
rent efforts to control international music sharing. Part I out-
lines the important historical events that led to the music-
sharing crisis. Then, using the Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios
Inc. v. Grokster case as an example, Part II illustrates how U.S.
personal jurisdiction law may falter in future cases of online
music-sharing litigation. The possibility for personal jurisdic-
tion problems in Grokster, however, is only one example of how
countries, when left to their own legal devices, may fail to pro-
tect copyright holders effectively. Consequently, Part II of this
Note also examines how the TRIPS Agreement fails to provide
sufficient provisions for enforcing copyright infringement. Ul-
timately, this Note shows that, until uniform enforcement pro-
RIAA v. Diamond Multimedia Systems: The Recording Industry Attempts to Slow
the MP3 Revolution - Taking Aim at the Jogger Friendly Diamond Rio, 7 RICH. J.L.
& TECH. 5 (2000), available at http://www.richmond.eduljolt/v7il/note2.html.
4. See Matt Richtel, With Napster Down, Its Audience Fans Out, N.Y. TIMES,
July 20, 2001, at Al.
5. See, e.g., John Snyder & Ben Snyder, Embrace File-sharing, or Die (Feb. 1,
2003), at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2003/02/01/file_trading manifesto/print
.html (arguing that 200 million people worldwide cannot be wrong when it comes to
the power of file sharing). John Snyder is a record executive, who argues that popu-
lar MP3s ultimately lead to more record sales, and that a more efficient, legitimate
online subscription service is needed to satisfy the demand for easier and cheaper
music access; Ben Snyder is his music-sharing son. Id. In contrast, for a persuasive
argument in favor of compensating artists and recording studios for their products,
see Joshua P. Binder, Current Developments of Public Performance Rights for Sound
Recordings Transmitted Online: You Push Play, But Who Gets Paid? 22 LOY. L.A.
ENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2001) (arguing that the benefits derived from musical works in a
commercial setting are assets, and therefore should be compensated, like other capi-
tal investments).
6. For a comprehensive discussion of concerns and strategies of the courts and
the music industry, see Jed Scully, Beyond Napster-Is it Just Music? Or Are Judi-
cial Resolutions Ineffective in Digital Commerce? 15 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 313 (2002).
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visions are enacted on a global level, the digital revolution will
surge onward, leaving the recording industry to pick up the
pieces.
I. CONTRIBUTING FORCES TO THE CURRENT STATE OF
THE LAW REGARDING MUSIC SHARING
A. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
Intellectual property law attempts to protect inventors or
creators of intellectual goods and services by granting them the
exclusive rights to control the use of their creations for a certain
length of time.7 Historically, copyright law developed out of the
invention of the printing press, because the publishers that were
expending large sums of money to print materials needed some
way to insure that their investments would reap a profit.8 To-
day, a commonly advanced philosophical justification for copy-
right law is utilitarian. 9 The utilitarian theory posits that the
purpose of copyright is to encourage the production of the widest
possible variety of creative goods at a low cost.10 The theory is
that people have no incentive to create artistic expressions or
new technologies if they do not receive compensation for their
efforts.1 1 That concern, however, is balanced against the public
need for information.12 Utilitarian theory is contrasted with the
natural rights theory, which suggests that a creator has an in-
terminable moral right to his or her creative product. 13 Both
schools have influenced intellectual property law significantly.1 4
Intellectual property law has also evolved over time with the in-
7. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 3
(World Intellectual Property Org. ed., Kluwer Law Int'l Ltd., 1997).
8. Id. at 23.
9. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT: PRINCIPLES, LAW, AND
PRACTICE 3 (Oxford Univ. Press 2001) (describing the utilitarian theory of copyright
law).
10. Id.
11. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 268 (Anthony D'Amoto &
Doris Estelle Long eds., 1997). Copyright laws also serve to protect inventors or per-
formers from competitors pirating their ideas or works. Id.
12. Paul Katzenberger & Annette Kur, TRIPS and Intellectual Property, in 18
IIC STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM GATT TO
TRIPS- THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 5-7 (Friedrich-Karl Beier & Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
13. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 11, at 27-28.
14. Id.
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troduction of new media, such as the phonogram 15 or the com-
puter. The evolution of substantive international copyright
norms has generally necessitated increased minimum standards
for protected subject matter and exclusive rights.16
To understand the current international intellectual prop-
erty conflicts over file sharing, it is important to understand the
unique copyright issues that music sharing raises within a his-
torical context. Currently, most nations consider the protection
of digital reproductions of musical works to be under the um-
brella of neighboring rights; in other words, rights that
"neighbor" on, or attach to, the copyright privileges authors of
original works possess. 17 Neighboring rights include the rights
of producers of phonograms in their phonograms, and the rights
of broadcasting organizations in their radio and television pro-
grams.'8 Protection of neighboring rights was first established
at the Rome Convention, 19 which came into force in May 1964.20
The Rome Convention was followed by the Geneva Phonograms
Convention, 21 which served to remedy two of the most notable
shortcomings of the earlier treaty: first, the Rome Convention
does not require minimum rights against the unauthorized im-
portation or allocation of phonograms; 22 and second, the Rome
Convention had attracted only a few adherents because of its in-
sistence on simultaneous adherence to the Berne and Universal
Copyright Convention and due to the political antagonism to-
wards the treaties that existed at the time.23 The World Intel-
15. Article 3 of the Rome Convention defines "phonogram" as "any exclusively
aural fixation of sounds of a performance or other sounds." International Conven-
tion for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, art. 3, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, 46.
16. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 13.
17. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 7, at 158. The United States, however, does not make the neighboring rights
distinction and consequently treats all copyright issues as being under the umbrella
of copyright law. Id. The primary remedies available to an owner of a violated copy-
right are an injunction to curb future infringement, and damages that compensate
the copyright owner for the depreciation caused by the infringement. Id. at 169.
18. Id.
19. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
20. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 38. The United States was not a signatory to
the Rome Convention, but the treaty was signed by forty other states. Id.
21. Convention for the Protection of Producers of Phonograms Against Unau-
thorized Duplication of their Phonograms, Oct. 29, 1971, 866 U.N.T.S. 67.
22. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 41.
23. Id.
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lectual Property Organization (WIPO)24 Performances and Pho-
nograms Treaty25 further supplemented the Rome Convention
and the Geneva Agreement by adding additional substantive re-
quirements. Under the Performances and Phonograms Treaty,
performers receive rights of "attribution" and "integrity" in their
live aural performances or in their phonogram products. 26 The
agreement requires that performers receive the economic rights
to fix their performances, to broadcast unfixed performances, to
reproduce the performances fixed in their phonograms, and to
distribute those performances fixed in phonograms. 27  The
treaty also gives phonogram producers comparable rights for
making those phonograms available to the public.28
B. THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
On December 15, 1993, the Uruguay Round of multilateral
trade negotiations held under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) concluded, and the resulting agreement was
adopted on April 15, 1994, in Marrakesh, Morocco. 29 The Uru-
guay Round included the first multinational discussion of the
impact of intellectual property rights on international trade.30
The result of that specific discussion was the Agreement on
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS).31 This Note focuses specifically on the neighboring
24. In 1967, WIPO was founded as an agency of the United Nations to adminis-
ter treaties and facilitate global cooperation in intellectual property matters. World
Intellectual Property Organization, General Information, at http://www.wipo.inti
about-wipo/enlgib.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). Currently, the organization has
181 member states and administers 23 treaties. See World Intellectual Property
Organization, Treaties and Contracting Parties, at http://www.wipo.int/treaties
/enindex.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2004). WIPO treaties fall into three categories:
(1) those that establish international protection; (2) those that facilitate interna-
tional protection; and (3) those that establish classification systems along with pro-
cedures for improving them and keeping them current. INTRODUCTION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 29.
25. WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 78,
available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/wppt/index.html.
26. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 43.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra
note 7, at 475 (citing Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organi-
zation [hereinafter WTO Agreement], Annex 1C, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS- RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 81 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]).
30. Id.
31. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29. The TRIPS Agreement states explicitly
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rights provisions of this treaty.
The TRIPS Agreement specifies that countries should pro-
vide effective enforcement of neighboring rights for phonogram
performers and producers.3 2 It is ambiguous, however, in terms
of procedural detail, an inadequacy that is described later in
this Note. Nevertheless, the TRIPS Agreement is the first
widely subscribed multilateral intellectual property agreement
that is enforceable between governments, which allows for con-
flict resolution through the World Trade Organization's dispute
settlement mechanism. 33 The TRIPS Agreement also provides
minimum standards of copyright enforcement, although nations
are free to enact stricter standards than are contemplated in
TRIPS.34
The Berne Convention, which is incorporated into the
TRIPS Agreement by reference, provides that "all authors of
works published in contracting states, irrespective of their na-
tionality, should be treated without discrimination under the
national law of a member country and without being subjected
to any formalities," like registration or notice. 35 International
conventions and agreements on intellectual property protection,
that it does not impair the validity of either the Revised Berne Convention or the
Rome Convention, although it may take precedence over both prior agreements in
the field of music piracy, because of its specific regulation of phonogram producers in
Article 14. Id.; see also Paul Katzenberger, TRIPS and Copyright Law, in 18 IIC
STUDIES: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM GATT TO
TRIPS- THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS 60 (Friedrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996) (citing TRIPS
Agreement, art. 14).
32. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, arts. 41-49.
33. Id.
34. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 16. Copyright treaties may manifest them-
selves differently in different nations. Some countries view treaties as self-
executing, or as existing as a source of rights directly applicable to private parties,
while others hold that private actions must be founded on domestic legislation that
implements the treaty. Id. at 14. International intellectual property expert Paul
Goldstein uses the following example:
mhe owner of world-wide rights in a work, if the work is exploited without
the owner's authority in a civil law country like Italy, may directly invoke
the applicable terms of the Berne Convention as the governing law
while.., in Canada ... the owner's rights will be measured exclusively by
the terms of the Canadian Copyright Act.
Id. at 14-15. Nevertheless, if a country holds a treaty to be self-executing, that does
not mean that the nation cannot enact legislation encompassing more subject matter
or extend more exclusive rights than are contemplated by the treaty's minimum
standards. Id. at 16.
35. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (Marshall A. Leaf-
fer ed., 2d ed. 1997).
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however, contain very few regulations on enforcement of
rights.36 If signatory countries choose to stipulate enforcement
measures for their own countries, there is no assurance that
they will be effective or will match the force of other nations'
laws.37
C. UNITED STATES COPYRIGHT LAW
1. Copyright Act of 1976
As previously indicated, member states of WIPO are al-
lowed to supplement the treaty agreements to which they are
signatories with stricter laws.38 In recent centuries, the United
States has been a massive force in intellectual property output,
and consequently, has some of the most comprehensive copy-
right protection legislation in the world. However, one of the
primary problems with developing a strategy for curbing the
music sharing revolution is finding a feasible legal framework
for challenging it.39 The United States Copyright Act of 1976
extended copyright protection to specific fixed expressions, like
books, movies, sculptures, musical works, and sound recordings,
and was the first legislation to provide for protection of digital
expression, by granting exclusive rights to creators of computer
programs.40 The Copyright Act identifies six exclusive rights of
the creator: the rights to reproduce, adapt, distribute, publicly
display, and publicly perform a copyrighted work, along with, in
the case of sound recordings, the right to perform the digital au-
dio transmission publicly.41 Section 101 of the Act defines the
transmission of a song as a communication by any device in
which "sounds are received beyond the place from which they
are sent."42
36. Thomas Dreier, TRIPS and the Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights,
in 18 IIC STUDIES: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY AND COPYRIGHT LAW: FROM
GATT TO TRIPS- THE AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 249 (Friedrich-Karl Beier and Gerhard Schricker eds., 1996).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See generally Natalie Koss, The Digital Music Dilemma: Protecting Copy-
right in the Age of Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 5 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 94 (2003).
40. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see Binder, supra note 5, at 3.
41. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1994 & Supp. V 1999); see also Binder, supra note 5, at 3.
42. 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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2. Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The Copyright Act was amended in 1998 with the enact-
ment of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17
U.S.C. § 512, which was enacted partly in response to the WIPO
conference in Geneva.43 The DMCA governs limitations on li-
ability relating to material online. The objective of Title 1 of the
DMCA was to rewrite U.S. copyright laws to comply with two of
the WIPO Treaties that were concluded in 1996, as well as to
strengthen protection for copyrighted works in electronic for-
mats.44 The DMCA makes it illegal for a person to manufac-
ture, import, or sell to the public any device or technology that is
designed primarily to circumvent copyright protection meas-
ures.
45
Napster, the Internet's first music sharing service, allowed
individual users to upload individual CD collections onto the
Internet, to search the collections of other users, and to
download the music they desired. 46 Napster included a dis-
claimer on its website which stated that users were responsible
for complying with federal and state copyright laws: "As a condi-
tion to your account with Napster, you agree that you will not
use the Napster service to infringe the intellectual property
rights of others in any way."47 It was widely understood, how-
ever, that illegal files were being traded at a tremendous rate.
Ultimately, on December 6, 1999, eighteen record compa-
nies joined forces and filed suit against Napster for contributory
and vicarious infringement of the right to distribute and repro-
duce a copyrighted work.48 Napster countered with a summary
43. See Amy K. Jensen, Copy Protection of CDs: The Recording Industry's Lat-
est Attempt at Preventing the Unauthorized Digital Distribution of Music, 21 J.
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 241, 247 (2003) (citing Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512 (1998)).
44. Nehila, supra note 3, at 204.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. See Liz Robinson, Music on the Internet: An International Copyright Di-
lemma, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 183, 211 (2000) (quoting About Us, Napster, at
http://www.napster.com/company§.html (last visited Dec. 19, 2000)). Napster's web-
site, along with its service, has been radically revamped, so this page is currently
unavailable. See also David Balaban, The Battle of the Music Industry: The Distri-
bution of Audio and Video Works Via the Internet, Music and More, 12 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 235, 236-37 (describing how a single copy of a
sound recording, once uploaded onto the Internet, can provide an unlimited number
of perfect, unlicensed copies available for free distribution).
48. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001); see
Nehila, supra note 3, at 207.
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judgment motion, arguing that it was protected under the safe
harbor provision of the DMCA, 17 U.S.C. § 512(a). 49 The com-
pany argued that: (1) any infringing users have no direct rela-
tionship with Napster and are not engaged in a commercial ac-
tivity; (2) Napster is supplying a technology that is capable of
significant non-commercial non-infringing uses; (3) consumers
are sharing music on a non-commercial basis; and (4) Napster is
an ISP that has no ability to "know" the specific locations of its
users.5 0 The court held that because Napster did not "transmit,
route, or provide connections through its system," it had failed
to demonstrate that it qualified under the safe harbor rule.5 1
After Napster lost its summary judgment motion, it again lost
at the appellate level with a fair use argument.52
49. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-05183 MHP, 2000 WL
573136, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 12, 2000), affd A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239
F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). The safe harbor provision of the DMCA limits liability
"for infringement of copyright by reason of the [service] provider's transmitting,
routing, or providing connections for, material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service provider .. " 17 U.S.C. § 512(a) (1999). It
states:
Transitory digital network communications- A service provider shall not
be liable for monetary relief... for injunctive or other equitable relief, for
infringement of copyright by reason of the provider's transmitting, routing,
or providing connections for, material through a system or network con-
trolled or operated by or for the service provider, or by reason of the inter-
mediate and transient storage of that material in the course of such trans-
mitting, routing, or providing connections, if-
the transmission of the material was initiated by or at the direction of a
person other than the service provider;
the transmission, routing, provision of connections, or storage is carried out
through an automatic technical process without selection of the material by
the service provider;
the service provider does not select the recipients of the material except as
an automatic response to the request of another person;
no copy of the material made by the service provider in the course of such
intermediate or transient storage is maintained on the system or network
in a manner ordinarily accessible to anyone other than anticipated recipi-
ents, and no such copy is maintained on the system or network in a manner
ordinarily accessible to such anticipated recipients for a longer period than
is reasonably necessary for the transmission, routing, or provision of con-
nections; and
the material is transmitted through the system or network without modifi-
cation of its content.
Id.
50. Nehila, supra note 3, at 208.
51. A&M Records, Inc., 2000 WL 573136, at *8.
52. See A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1004.
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3. Fair Use Doctrine
The fair use doctrine, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 107, provides
courts with four factors to determine whether copyright in-
fringement has occurred.53 Those four factors are: (1) the pur-
pose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substan-
tiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as
a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.54 Another important as-
pect of the analysis pertaining to technology that facilitates
copying is whether the product is also capable of noninfringing
uses. 55 Noninfringing uses can include a variety of uses, such as
watching movies that have been paid for on a VCR, or recording
birthday parties on a camcorder.5 6 Some illegitimate online mu-
sic distributors have attempted to gain protection under the fair
use doctrine.5 7 As it currently stands, however, the fair use doc-
trine does not encompass digital transmission of music. 58
D. KAZAA LITIGATION
One of Napster's most successful progeny is Kazaa, an Aus-
tralian venture headed by entrepreneur Nikki Hemming, with
operations scattered throughout the globe in Estonia, Australia,
53. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
54. Id.
55. Jeffrey P. Weingart & Monica B. Richman, Copyright Law: Fair Use and
the Internet, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 2, 2000, at B8; see, e.g., Oak Indus. Inc. v. Zenith Elec.
Corp., 697 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (describing how the seller of a device, which
is incidentally capable of performing an infringing function unrelated to its normal
use, is not normally liable for contributory infringement).
56. For example, in Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Su-
preme Court held that Sony Entertainment Corporation could not be liable for
videotape copyright infringement of Universal's television programs, because video-
taping was merely a privately utilized mechanism for viewing programs at a later
time. 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984). The Court also held that the individual consumer
act of creating a personal archive did not create enough of a detrimental effect on
the market to warrant its prohibition. Id. In addition, the Court found that the Be-
tamax videotaping machine was capable of "substantial noninfringing uses," which
added to its acceptability. Id.
57. See Weingart & Richman, supra note 55, at B8 (discussing Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994), Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 417;
UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F. Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000), A&M
Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. C 99-5183 MHP, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11862, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000)); see also Nehila, supra note 3, at 199.
58. Weingart & Richman, supra note 55, at B8.
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Vanuatu, Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, and the West In-
dies.5 9 The company will not explain how its software ulti-
mately works, although it does deny having a central server like
Napster.60 The wildly popular spin-off has attracted tens of mil-
lions of Internet users around the world.61 The developer of the
technology defends the product as a "breakthrough technology
that makes things more efficient," and as "a solution that every-
one was crying out for," rather than as an instrument manipu-
lated to infringe upon recording companies' copyright privi-
leges.6 2
The development of the Kazaa BV Company was truly a
global affair. Three Estonian youths wrote the code, and Swed-
ish and Danish businessmen joined together to market the
technology as a Netherlands company.6 3 Eventually, Kazaa BV,
in response to impending litigation in the Netherlands, sold its
key assets to Sharman Networks, which ultimately incorporated
in Vanuatu.64 The RIAA is convinced that the Sharman deci-
sion to formalize its venture in this very private country was
based on a desire for secrecy and refuge from international
copyright laws; however, Sharman maintains that it was merely
seeking the best tax situation.6 5
Kazaa was successful in its attempts to fend off litigation in
the Netherlands. 66 The company, however, did not fare as well
in the United States. 67 In 2003, two related cases were joined in
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster.68 Motion picture
and recording industry members brought the first case under 17
U.S.C. § 501, as a violation of their copyright privileges. 69 Pro-
fessional songwriters and music publishers brought the second
case as a class action citing similar copyright claims against the
59. Associated Press, Hollywood Attacks File-Sharing Site, CBS NEWS.COM,
Feb. 3, 2003, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/030tech/main
539104.html.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1079 (C.D. Cal. 2003); Associated Press, supra note 59, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/02/O30techmain539104.html (noting that
Sharman Networks is now Kazaa's official company name).
65. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1079.
66. Id.
67. See id.
68. Id. at 1080.
69. Id.
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defendant companies. 70 The two actions were subsequently con-
solidated for discovery and pretrial purposes.7 1
The consolidated action was brought against Grokster, Mu-
sicCity, and Kazaa BV, three separate companies, each of which,
at the time of the filing of the suit, branded, marketed, and dis-
tributed individual software for music sharing.7 2 Their legal is-
sues were very much the same, however, because all three com-
panies initially utilized the same "FastTrack" networking
technology as their peer-to-peer (P2P) platform consisting of
software that was developed by the founders of Kazaa BV, Nik-
las Zennstrom and Janus Friis.73 Consequently, users of all
three software platforms were connected to the same P2P net-
work and could exchange files freely. 74
1. How the Kazaa System Functions
The Kazaa system operates in a manner conceptually
analogous to the original Napster format, although there are
some significant modifications.7 5  Essentially, the Sharman
company provides its users with the Kazaa Media Desktop
(KMD), which is proprietary software that allows online cus-
tomers to search for and exchange digital media with other
FastTrack Network users across the globe.7 6 The Kazaa.com
website serves as a central distribution and customer service
hub for the software.7 7 Sharman, however, denies having a cen-
tral server like Napster.78 Most of Sharman's revenue is gener-
ated through advertising on its website, because the KMD soft-
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. In a footnote, the court indicates that operations have changed since
the filing of the lawsuit. Id. at 1080 n.1. First, the operation of the Kazaa system
was transferred to Sharman Networks. Id. Second, the MusicCity/Streamcast de-
fendant no longer uses the FastTrack technology. Id. Now, Streamcast employs the
"open" Gnutella networking technology and distributes its own technology rather
than a branded version of the Kazaa Media Desktop it previously marketed. Id.
This is a good example of how quickly things change in Internet commerce.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1081.
76. Id.
77. Id. The software can be downloaded from servers (operated by Sharman) to
the individual user's computer. Id. Once the software is downloaded, the user can
elect to share various files on the user's hard drive, such as music or video files, e-
books, text files, or software applications. Once the share feature is enabled, the
user is automatically connected to the FastTrack network. Id.
78. Id.
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ware itself is free. Sharman does not directly sell advertising
space; rather, it bundles its KMD software with other third-
party software that operates whenever KMD is launched. 79 The
third party software, in turn, attracts advertising from other
third-party servers, and then displays that advertising through
the KMD interface.8 0
2. Sharman's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal
Jurisdiction
In January 2002, Kazaa was facing litigation in both the
Netherlands and in California.8 1 It was at this time that it
transferred ownership of the company's key assets to Sharman
Networks, including the Kazaa.com website and domain, the
KMD software, and a long-term license to the FastTrack soft-
ware.8 2 Essentially, Sharman acquired the primary assets of
the company without formally acquiring the company.8 3 Shar-
man explicitly disclaimed assumption of any of Kazaa BV's li-
abilities, including any liability from the pending lawsuits.8 4
Kazaa BV, however, ceased defending the California action
early on in the litigation, so the court's analysis centered on
Sharman's argument for lack of personal jurisdiction.8 5 On
January 9, 2003, a district court judge in California denied
Sharman's motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction,
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, improper venue, and forum
non conveniens.8 6 Nevertheless, the court's decision and sup-
porting argument is not a complete panacea to the complex, in-
ternational copyright issues that future cases may present.
Unless the United States revisits its conception of personal ju-
risdiction with an eye for the possibility of online contacts, fu-
ture control of illegal music sharing will be significantly limited.
E. CURRENT EFFORTS
In September 2003, the Recording Industry Association of
America (RIAA) unleashed a series of individual lawsuits
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1080.
82. Id. at 1080-81.
83. Id. at 1081.
84. Id. at 1080.
85. Id. at 1081-82.
86. Id. at 1079.
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE [Vol.14:1
against music-sharers across the country, as well as in Den-
mark, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere.8 7 The RJAA hired an un-
disclosed company to search through a list of several hundred
popular songs and to automatically send a "copyright infringe-
ment warning" to Grokster and Kazaa users who seemed to be
sharing those musical works.88 The RAA estimated that one
million of those messages could be sent out every week.8 9 It is
unclear, however, whether industry efforts will be able to curtail
the escalating momentum of the Napster spin-offs. 90 Techno-
logical advances in sound quality and download speed continue
to attract new users who are tired of paying for expensive CDs,
and websites that allow for "artist authorized" downloads will
continue to blur the lines between music piracy and free mar-
keting. 91 Napster has reopened its website as a legitimate music
87. Houston Chronicle News Services, Students Scared, Angry over Music Law-
suits (Sept. 16, 2003), available at http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/
headline/tech2090660. The RIAA reported that it was suing 261 frequent users
across the United States (with a large percentage of college students as targets) for
as much as $150,000 per song distributed online. See Frank Ahrens, RIAA Lawsuits
Meet Surprised Targets, WASH. POST, Sept. 10, 2003, available at http://www.msnbc
.comlnews/964291.asp?cpl=l; see also Torrance Mendez, US Recording Giants Hunt
Online Pirates- Download Downside, WEST AUSTL., June 27, 2003, available at
2003 WL 64454494; Steve Seidenberg, New Battleground in File-Sharing: After
Copyright Loss, Strategy Shifts to Going After Individuals, NAT'L L.J., May 5, 2003,
at A15; Top European Music Stars Urge Ban on Internet Music Sharing, CNEWS,
July 14, 2000, available at http://www.canoe.calTechNewsOO07/13-mp3.html.
88. See Ahrens, supra note 87, available at http://www.msnbc.com/news/964291
.asp?cpl=l.
89. Seidenberg, supra note 87, at A15. It is unclear, however, if the warning
messages would be read. Users leave file-sharing programs running unattended for
hours at a time, and rarely read the IM messages that come with the system. Id. It
is also undecided whether the messages violate some state anti-spam laws, or
whether the users could possibly sue for trespass to chattels. Id.
90. See Koss, supra note 39, at 96. Many Americans feel that they are entitled
to "free music," because fair use allows for recording of music off the radio. Id. at 95.
Furthermore, public perception of the recording industry is one of skepticism and
cynicism. See Houston Chronicle News Service, supra note 87, available at
http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mplheadline/tech/2090660. The distrust of
the wealthy music industry has only increased with the Recording Industry's new
individual-based litigation strategy. See id. In addition, ignorance of copyright law
compels the belief of some citizens that the Fair Use Act allows consumers to do
whatever they want with CDs they purchase. See Robinson, supra note 47, at 216;
see also Margaret A. McGurk & Christina Oliva, Napster Ruling Won't Stop Music
Sharing, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, July 28, 2000, available at http://www.enquirer
.comeditions2000/7/28fin-napsterruling-wont.html (describing how many people
only see benefits for free music sites, and how the shutting down of Napster will only
push users to the alternative sites with alternative methods for swapping files,
bringing their extensive music supply with them).
91. See Robinson, supra note 47, at 184-85. For a provocative post-modern dis-
cussion of the morality of Internet anonymity, see Albert Z. Kovacs, Quieting the
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store that will offer individual song downloads for ninety-nine
cents each, mimicking the Apple version of the legal site
iTunes.92 Nevertheless, it is yet to be seen whether consumers
that have been receiving music without cost for up to five years
will be open to switching to a payment-based scheme. 93
CD manufacturers have also attempted to employ new
techniques to thwart piracy. 94 One such tactic involves encryp-
tion technologies that block digital transmission onto computer
hard drives.95 Computer hackers, however, have consistently
been able to crack the encryption code.96 In addition, some con-
sumers are concerned about the invasion of their privacy that
may occur if the recording industry instead attempts to target
individual computer hard drives through watermarking or cook-
ies.97
Virtual Prison Riot: Why the Internet's Spirit of "Sharing"Must be Broken, 51 DUKE
L.J. 753 (2001) (describing how the Internet allows users to exist independently of
their real world identities and how that secrecy allows them to transcend real world
moral boundaries).
92. Ethan Smith & Nick Wingfield, New Ways to Pay 99 Cents for Music: In
Wake of Apple's iTunes, Sites Target Windows Users: The Birth of (Legal) Napster,
WALL ST. J. Oct. 9, 2003, at D1.
93. See Neil Strauss, Record Sales' Woes Go Beyond File Swapping; Legal Tac-
tics may Alienate Consumers, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 10, 2003, available at
http:/fwww.iht.com/articles/lO9428.html. One example of a legitimate music sharing
system is pressplay.com. In exchange for the ability to download music to the user's
online account, $9.99 is deducted from the user's bank account every month (even if
the system is not utilized), and $5.00 is required to actually download the song from
the online database to the computer's hard drive. Pressplay, at http://www.press
play.com (last visited Sept. 29, 2003). The author has experienced technical difficul-
ties with the system in the past; it is unclear what the consumer response will be
overall.
94. See Jensen, supra note 43, at 242. For example, when a purchaser of a CD
attempts to listen to the music on a computer, he or she would be directed to a web
site controlled by the CD manufacturer and perhaps music companies. Id. After the
user entered personal information, he or she would be able to use the CD, but only
in proprietary format. Id. Another tactic involves employing disc layouts that are
nontransferable to a computer format, inhibiting music sharers' ability to share new
music. Id.
95. Allen N. Dixon, Address at the JSO 4th Asia-Pacific Copyright and
Neighboring Rights Seminar (March 8, 2003), available at http://www.ifpi.orglsite-
contentflegal/allen dixon.speech.html.
96. Id. See generally S.H. Kwok & S.M. Lui, A License Management Model for
Peer-to-Peer Music Sharing, 1 INT'L J. INFO. TECH. & DECISION MAKING 541 (2002)
(describing an alternate form of licensing for controlling online music sharing).
97. Jensen, supra note 43, at 254. Digital watermarking is defined as "a pat-
tern of bits inserted into a digital image, audio or video file that identifies the file's
copyright information (author, rights, etc.)." E-Commerce Guide, at http://e-
comm.webopedia.comlTERMddigitalwatermark.html (last visited Aug. 23, 2004).
A cookie is defined as "a small file or part of a file stored on a World Wide Web user's
computer, created and subsequently read by a website server, and containing per-
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Other countries have also unleashed new tactics aimed at
forcing music-sharers to see the error of their ways. For exam-
ple, the Canadian Recording Industry Association has not tar-
geted individual users, but has instead launched litigation
against illegal online distributors and produced television com-
mercials designed to make users feel remorse for illegally
downloading materials. 98 In contrast, in Belgium, the Belgian
arm of the International Federation of the Phonographic Indus-
try (IFPI) turned over hundreds of individual users to the police
in 2001.99 Similarly, in April 2003, Australian Federal Police
charged three Sydney students with copyright violations alleg-
edly worth over sixty million dollars.100 Even though the Aus-
tralian government seems willing to fight piracy within its own
borders, Australian universities are still fighting U.S. efforts to
obtain the identities of suspected copyright pirates on their uni-
versity networks. 101 That resistance reflects the lack of global
unity and cooperation that has so far made it impossible to
thwart the explosion of Internet piracy.
II. LIMITATIONS PLAGUING THE POSSIBILITY OF
FUTURE CONTROL
The current U.S. effort to control music sharing is ham-
pered by ineffective standards and mechanisms for quelling the
insatiable global demand. Although the legal system has made
some strides towards suppressing the primary culprits, as a
whole, it remains ill-equipped to deal with many of the knotty
issues raised by music-sharing activities. Previous attempts to
hold users responsible for their actions have been complicated
by deficiencies both in U.S. domestic law regarding personal ju-
risdiction and contributory liability, and in international intel-
sonal information (as a user identification code, customized preferences, or a record
of pages visited)." Merriam Webster Online, at http://www.merriamwebster.com/cgi-
bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=cookies&x=11&y=ll (last visited Aug. 23,
2004). Cookies can therefore be used to generate profiles of web usage habits, which
may infringe on personal privacy.
98. Ted Bridis, Music Industry Escalates Net Fight: Threatens to Sue Individu-
als Illegally Sharing Files, WINNEPEG FREE PRESS, June 26, 2003, at A12.
99. CNET News.com Staff, Global Music Industry to ID Napster fans, CNET
NEWS.CoM, Feb. 21, 2001, at http://news.com.com/2009-1023-252888.html?legacy=
cnet&xlr8yourmac.
100. Mendez, supra note 87, available at 2003 WL 64454494. WA Internet Us-
ers Association also reports that intimidating letters have been sent to Internet ser-
vice providers in Australia. Id.
101. Id.
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lectual property treaties.
A. PERSONAL JURISDICTION COMPLICATIONS
Asserting jurisdiction over foreign defendants can be com-
plicated for a number of reasons. First, as illustrated above in
the Australian example, foreign governments may not cooperate
in identifying the perpetrators that the accusing country is at-
tempting to indict. Second, asserting jurisdiction over those de-
fendants may be complicated by the accusing country's own inef-
ficient, overly specialized, or outdated jurisdictional laws.
Moreover, the Internet has dramatically altered the global
transactional arena, and many countries have not fully trans-
formed their systems to reflect those changes. The current state
of U.S. personal jurisdiction law may thwart its own efforts to
protect against online music sharing.
In the United States, personal jurisdiction can easily be as-
serted for traditional reasons like physical presence, domicile, or
consent; nevertheless, in the case of an incorporated foreign de-
fendant, due process requires that a non-resident defendant
have "certain minimum contacts with the forum, such that the
continuation of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice."102 In Grokster, in order for the
California district court to have personal jurisdiction over the
Australian/Vanuatuan company, the exercise of jurisdiction
must be authorized under California's long-arm jurisdictional
statute and must comport with constitutional due process limi-
tations. 103 In California's long-arm statute, jurisdiction is au-
thorized to the fullest extent of the Constitution, so the only
question that the district court had to answer was whether the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Sharman was consistent
with constitutional due process.10 4 Since Sharman was not sub-
102. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1082 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (citing Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))).
103. Id. (citing Aanestad v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 521 F.2d 1298, 1300 (9th Cir.
1974)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
104. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (citing Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 410.10
(2002)); see Peterson v. Highland Music, Inc., 140 F.3d 1313, 1317 n.2 (9th Cir.
1998). It is important to note that in a motion to dismiss for lack of personal juris-
diction, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing that jurisdiction. Only a prima
facie showing, however, must be made when a court has not made any findings of
fact. Factual allegations made by the defendant in the Grokster litigation were
taken as true, although the court was allowed to look beyond the pleadings to any
evidence before the court. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1082 (citing Cargill Intern.
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ject to the traditional bases for personal jurisdiction of presence
in the forum, the court focused its analysis on whether the fol-
lowing types of jurisdiction existed: (1) general jurisdiction; (2)
specific jurisdiction; and/or (3) an alternative basis for purpose-
ful availment based on the "effects test."10 5
The plaintiffs in the Grokster case alleged that Sharman's
in-forum activities extended to the following activities:
1) Provision of the KMD software to approximately two million Cali-
fornia residents and execution of end-user license agreements between
Sharman and these users;
2) Use of California and U.S. agents, including a Los Angeles-based
public relations firm, a California company engaged in selling and
serving advertising to users of the KMD software, and a San Fran-
cisco-based law firm;
3) Contracts Sharman assumed from Kazaa BV, including use of Cali-
fornia-based CNET.com for recording the number of copies of Defen-
dant's software downloaded, and advertising-related agreements with
California and U.S. companies; and
Inclusion in certain contracts assumed from Kazaa BV of California
and other U.S. state choice of law and forum selection clauses, includ-
ing in the FastTrack licensing agreement. 10 6
1. General Jurisdiction
The plaintiffs in the Grokster case did not meet the fairly
high burden for establishing general jurisdiction, 107 which es-
sentially requires that defendant's contacts "approximate physi-
cal presence." 108
S.A. v. M/T Pavel Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012, 1019 (2d Cir. 1993)).
105. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-95. For a discussion of the effects test,
see discussion supra Part II.A.3.
106. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Op-
position to Defendants Sharman's and LEF's Motions to Dismiss at 4-10).
107. In the case of non-resident defendants, general jurisdiction exists where the
defendants' contacts with the forum state are "continuous and systematic," and the
exercise of jurisdiction does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and substan-
tial justice." Id. (quoting Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir.
1995)). The court noted that the plaintiffs in this case did not make a meaningful
attempt to establish general jurisdiction. Id. In fact, they limited their argument to
a two-sentence footnote. Id.
108. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th
Cir. 2000) (quoting Gates Lear Jet Corp. v. Jensen, 743 F.2d 1325, 1331 (9th Cir.
2000)). At the time of the case, the Supreme Court had upheld general jurisdiction
in only one case that involved wide-ranging contacts, and the Ninth Circuit has
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Although Sharman does engage in a continuous stream of
commercial contact with the forum state, the company is not
registered or licensed to do business in California, nor does it
have any substantial physical presence in the state.10 9 More-
over, commercial contacts without other evidence of corporate
presence have not traditionally constituted sufficient evidence to
satisfy general jurisdiction. 110 Consequently, the court in Grok-
ster held that general jurisdiction did not exist against Sharman
Networks."'
As the doctrine of general jurisdiction currently stands, it is
not satisfied in the Grokster case. It is worth noting, however,
that in the context of Internet transactions, physical presence is
not a terribly effective or meaningful concept. 11 2 Companies
that would have necessarily located offices in every state in the
past can now incorporate and conduct business in another coun-
try, and still sustain a comparable level of business in those
same states. The people who make up those companies are not
actually physically present in consumers' homes when they en-
gage in online transactions, but arguably a direct transaction
still results. In the past, courts could not have conceived of the
business interactions that now occur without interpersonal con-
tact. By explicitly expanding the specific jurisdiction concept to
include online transactions, like purchases or downloads, courts
could solve many possible personal jurisdiction problems and
could acknowledge the new transactional paradigms made pos-
sible by new technologies.
2. Specific Jurisdiction
Under the prevailing Ninth Circuit doctrine, specific juris-
diction is presumptively reasonable where: "1) a nonresident de-
fendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting
activities in the forum state, thereby invoking the protections of
regularly declined to use the doctrine. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1083.
109. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1084. Sharman does not appear to have any
offices, employees, or assets in California. Id.
110. Id. (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408
(1984) (establishing that no general jurisdiction existed where Colombian corpora-
tion repeatedly purchased helicopter parts in Texas and held training in the state,
but had no offices, agents, employees, or a license to do business there)).
111. Id.
112. The Internet creates unique challenges for the concept of "presence." Al-
bert Kovacs states, "[b]ecause in cyberspace people can exist independent of their
names, identities, faces, and personalities, they often transcend the real world's
moral and legal boundaries." Kovacs, supra note 91, at 754.
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its laws; and 2) the plaintiffs claims arise out of the defendants'
forum-related activities."' 13 As described above, Sharman did
purposefully direct activities toward California; the Grokster
court, however, questioned whether several of those means of
contact fit under the relatedness requirement.11 4
The Ninth Circuit uses a wide-ranging "but for" test of re-
latedness that is more inclusive than tests adopted in other cir-
cuits. 115 Essentially, the second prong of the test is satisfied if,
but for the contacts between the defendant and the forum state,
the claim would not have arisen.1 16 The plaintiffs in Grokster
attempted to classify all of Sharman's activities in California as
being essential to its ability to infringe on their copyright. In
other words, "but for Sharman's overall corporate activities, it
would not be in business and would not be engaging in the al-
leged infringement of Plaintiffs copyrights." 117  Nevertheless,
but for contacts must convey some proximate causation to be an
acceptable source of personal jurisdiction. 1 8 The Grokster court
found that all corporate contacts could be considered in further-
ance of corporate purposes, and interpreting the rule that
broadly would swallow its purpose altogether. 119 Consequently,
the court held that Sharman's public relations contacts, law
firm contacts, advertising contacts, and the use of a California
company in counting downloads were not but for causes of the
alleged infringement.1 20
Nonetheless, the court found that Sharman's distribution of
the KMD software and the licensing of its use were but for
causes of the alleged infringement. 12' Sharman was unsuccess-
ful in arguing that its Internet activities were passive in nature,
113. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1084; see also Ochoa v. J.B. Martin & Sons
Farms, 287 F.3d 1182, 1189 (9th Cir. 2002); Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d
470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995).
114. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1085-86.
115. Id. at 1085; see also Loral Terracom v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 49 F.3d 555, 561
(9th Cir. 1995).
116. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1085.
117. Id. Plaintiffs argued that retaining law and public relations firms and ad-
vertising-related sales ultimately perpetuated the existence of the Sharman busi-
ness. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. The court also noted that although Plaintiffs allege that Sharman en-
gaged in advertising specifically to California residents, that advertising was served
by third-party companies. Id. at 1086. Therefore, that direct contact was not ap-
propriately considered under a but for analysis. Id.
121. Id. "But for Sharman's acts in these regards, Plaintiffs' claims of direct in-
fringement never would have arisen against Sharman." Id.
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as its software could be downloaded by anyone in the world, not
just by Californians. 122 Essentially, Sharman contended that
the only distribution contacts with California were those that
were initiated by California residents. 123
It is here that the court's analysis weakened. It acknowl-
edged that personal jurisdiction is typically not found where
contacts with the forum state are the result of isolated or fortui-
tous acts not directed by the defendant. 124 It also recognized
that the operation of a website where the contacts with a forum
state consist of viewings of the website's content typically will
not give rise to specific jurisdiction. 125 The court, however, set
up a kind of sliding scale of substantial activity towards the fo-
rum to determine whether Sharman's purposeful availment was
enough to overcome those barriers. The court cited Cybersell,
Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc. as its support for the contention that juris-
diction might be appropriate where Internet conduct includes
something more than just Internet viewing to prove that the
plaintiff directed substantial activity towards the forum.1 26
Cybersell is certainly an interesting comparison to Grokster.
In Cybersell, a Florida corporation offered web page construction
services under the name of Cybersell. 127 An Arizona company
had previously incorporated under the same name, although it
was not listed on the web and did not yet have a PTO permit for
the service mark. 28 The Arizona company attempted to bring
an infringement action in Arizona, but the court lacked personal
jurisdiction over the Florida defendant because general jurisdic-
tion was inappropriate, and also because the defendant did not
meet the specific jurisdiction requirement of purposeful avail-
ment. 29 The defendant would have needed to "purposefully di-
122. Id. Sharman further contended that it did not know the identity of the us-
ers of its software, and it also did not know the locations where downloads took
place. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980)
(holding that plaintiff failed to establish a sufficient basis for jurisdiction in Okla-
homa over a New York company when a consumer bought a car in New York and
drove it through Oklahoma)).
125. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 243 F. Supp. 2d 1073,
1087 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
126. Id. (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir.
1997)).
127. Cybersell, 130 F.3d at 415.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 416-20.
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rect efforts" at the forum's residents. 130 Similarly, although Ka-
zaa wanted as many users as possible (presumably so it could
charge more to its advertisers), the requirement of purposefully
directed efforts is starkly missing.
The Grokster court described several factors that aid in de-
termining whether specific jurisdiction can be established in a
website situation. 131 Those factors include: (1) whether the de-
fendant encouraged residents of the forum state to engage in
relevant contacts with the defendant; (2) whether there is evi-
dence that the contacts constitute a continuous and substantial
part of the defendant's business; (3) whether the defendant ex-
changed messages with forum residents or gained subscribers
through its contacts; or (4) whether the defendant otherwise
purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business in
the forum. 132
The court, in a cursory manner, noted two reasons why the
Sharman network satisfied the above factors. 133 First, the court
noted that Sharman admitted to having millions of users
worldwide, and the KMD software had been downloaded 143
million times. 134 Although it had no concrete factual evidence to
support the estimate, the court seemed to agree with the Plain-
tiffs' assertion that approximately two million of those software
users were from California. 35 Consequently, it asserted that it
would be mere cavil to reject the contention that Sharman en-
gaged in a significant amount of contact with California resi-
dents.136
Although the court might have been correct in this instance,
to state that it is mere quibble to contend otherwise is to avoid
the real underlying issues, revealing the flaws in the current
doctrine that may arise in future cases. The court did not spe-
cifically wrestle with the evaluating factors it espoused, and on
closer examination, this omission turns out to be substantial, if
130. Id. at 417.
131. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1087.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. The court indicated that one of Sharman's third-party advertising ven-
dors estimated that Kazaa had been downloaded by at least twenty million users in
the United States. Id. at 1087 n.6. Because California holds approximately twelve
percent of the country's population, the court accepted the Plaintiffs' contention that
approximately two million of those users are from California. Id. Although it is
likely that there are many users in California, the fact that the Kazaa website does
not keep track of the locations of its users does not help the Plaintiffs' argument.
136. Id. at 1087.
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not fatal. First, there was no express evidence tending to show
that Sharman encouraged Californians to engage in contacts
with the defendant. Of course, as a practical matter, Sharman
offered its services to anyone worldwide that downloaded the
software. Still, should that factor be enough to establish specific
acts of encouragement in California? Second, although the con-
tacts that Sharman made in California were arguably substan-
tial, there was no actual evidence presented to show that a "con-
tinuous and substantial part of the defendant's business" was in
the California area. 13 7 Such a requirement may be a mere for-
mality in a case with a company as hugely successful as Kazaa;
in future cases involving more obscure companies, however, the
absence of real evidence will likely be more significant. Third,
the court did not consider whether the defendant exchanged
messages with forum residents or gained subscribers through its
contacts. Finally, the court did not explicitly offer other exam-
ples of purposeful availment by Sharman. Arguably, the contact
with law firms and public relations or advertising companies
might have some supplemental persuasive weight, but since
those contacts were not considered appropriate for consideration
prior to the analysis of these four factors, that line of reasoning
is unpersuasive.
3. The Effects Test
The court justified its vulnerable analysis of specific juris-
diction by claiming that comprehensiveness was not required
due to the existence of the effects test.138 The court overtly as-
serted, "even if purposeful availment were not manifested by
Sharman's commercial contacts, it nonetheless may be demon-
strated through the 'effects test."'1 39 Essentially, under the ef-
fects test, even if a defendant does not directly contact the forum
state, purposeful availment may be demonstrated where the ef-
fects of a defendant's conduct are felt in that state.1 40 In 1998,
the Ninth Circuit clarified the effects test in Panavision Int'l
137. Again, no evidence indicating the specific number of Californian Kazaa us-
ers was offered. The advertiser's estimate of two million users, however, is sufficient
to indicate at least a substantial Internet presence in the State.
138. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1088.
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984) (establishing the effects
test); Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1321-22 (9th Cir. 1998) (sus-
taining jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant who registered Internet domain
names that infringed plaintiffs trademarks)).
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L.P. v. Toeppen,14' and held that three factors establish personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant: "(1) intentional ac-
tions (2) expressly aimed at the forum state (3) causing harm,
the brunt of which is suffered, and which the defendant knows
is likely to be suffered, in the forum state."'142
One significant complicating factor acknowledged by both
Sharman and the court was that Sharman's software does not,
in itself, infringe upon copyrights. The users are responsible for
any infringement that occurs. The court resolved this issue by
distinguishing between the plaintiffs' theories of liability. It ac-
knowledged that the effects test is likely sufficient to show pur-
poseful availment for purposes of the contributory infringement
claims, while it might not be enough to support an exercise of
jurisdiction for vicarious liability. 143
Still, it is worth noting that Panavision can be distin-
guished from the Grokster litigation in several ways. The
Panavision case consisted of a trademark dilution and infringe-
ment action against an Illinois defendant brought by a Califor-
nia resident plaintiff. First, the court held that "simply register-
ing someone else's trademark as a domain name and posting a
web site on the Internet is not sufficient to subject a party domi-
ciled in one state to jurisdiction in another."'144 It then distin-
guished this defendant's situation from Cybersell by indicating
that personal jurisdiction was proper, because the defendant
had engaged in a scheme for the purpose of extorting that
money from the plaintiff company. 145 As in Cybersell, the court
indicated that there must be "something more" to demonstrate
that the defendant directed his activity to the state bringing the
action. 146 The something more in the Panavision case consisted
of the defendant engaging in similar domain-registering conduct
with other companies, sending letters to the plaintiff company
offering to sell the domain name, and after they refused to sell,
registering a PanaFlex.com domain that merely said "hello"
once opened. 147
This kind of tortious conduct is, at least on some level, dis-
141. Panavision Int'l L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. Id. at 1321 (quoting Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482,
1486 (9th Cir. 1993)).
143. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1089.
144. Panavision, 141 F.3d at 1322 (citing Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell, Inc., 130
F.3d 414, 418 (9th Cir. 1997)).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 1319.
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tinguishable from Kazaa's interaction with the State of Califor-
nia. Kazaa merely registered a domain name and marketed
software that allowed other people to engage in copyright in-
fringement. The public relations firms that were allegedly con-
tacted by the company were not the plaintiffs bringing the ac-
tion. Arguably, the Kazaa company directed no action at the
plaintiffs in California. Moreover, the fact that Kazaa denied
having a central server further discredits any claim that the
company was engaged in doing any maintenance in furtherance
of the copyright infringement. In summary, personal jurisdic-
tion law in the United States must be elucidated more clearly if
it is to be effective in tackling the unique problems that online
transactions generate.
B. CONTRIBUTORY LIABILITY
Contributory infringement is built on the notion that "[o]ne
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes,
or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another,
may be held liable as a 'contributory' infringer."148 After Nap-
ster, Plaintiffs must offer proof that Sharman intended to con-
tribute to the infringing conduct of another.149 It is not enough
that the software merely allowed for such activity. 150 The Plain-
tiffs alleged both intentional conduct, and, more specifically, in-
tentional conduct directed at the forum state of California. 51 Of
course, the Napster court did not deal with these factual ques-
tions in the personal jurisdiction motion, but the concept of in-
tentional conduct is certainly blurred in an online medium. Can
the production of software and maintenance of a website that
passively allows for the quick and easy transfer of files fairly be
classified as deliberately illegal conduct? This issue is especially
thorny, considering the conduct must be "targeted at a plaintiff
whom the defendant knows to be a resident of the forum
state."152
Nevertheless, on July 2, 2003, the Grokster court made an-
other move towards shutting down the Kazaa empire when
Judge Wilson held that: (1) the distributor did not have stand-
148. Grokster, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 1089 (quoting Gershwin Pubrg Corp. v. Co-
lumbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971)).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1089-90.
152. Id. (quoting Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082,
1087 (9th Cir. 2000)).
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ing to maintain counterclaims under the Sherman Act or its
state law counterpart; and (2) the distributor was not entitled to
obtain declaratory relief as to a counterclaim of copyright mis-
use that it had raised as an affirmative defense.153 It appears
likely that Kazaa will be successfully extinguished by this ac-
tion. Still, the problems identified in the United States' per-
sonal jurisdiction jurisprudence may resurface in the future
with other entrepreneurial P2P companies.
C. DEFICIENCIES IN THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
Other problems will likely emerge on an international level
in attempts to control the music sharing craze. Specifically, the
TRIPS Agreement has several shortcomings that will likely
serve as obstacles to comprehensive copyright infringement pro-
tection. TRIPS was enacted as a flexible means of enforcing
each member states' intellectual property rules. 154 The agree-
ment allows countries to tie demands for stronger copyright pro-
tection to reciprocal concessions on exported materials, 55 be-
cause trade sanctions have been historically effective measures
for initiating stronger judicial measures of control. 156 Again, it
is worth noting that TRIPS is not the only agreement governing
international trade of copyrighted goods. 157 This section of the
Note nonetheless focuses on TRIPS because of its more recent
enactment, and because of its specific regulations in the field of
digital reproductions. 158
The TRIPS Agreement sets out several regulations for pro-
tecting performers, phonogram producers, and broadcasters.
Article 14 of the agreement specifies that:
153. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1213,
1223, 1226 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
154. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 47.
155. Id. at 47-48.
156. Id. Prior to TRIPS, the multilateral Revised Berne Convention governed
conflicts in international intellectual property; an agreement that controlled 111
member states at the time TRIPS was enacted. Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 59.
157. Neither the Revised Berne Convention nor the Rome Convention has been
impaired by the enactment of TRIPS. See id.
158. See generally Katzenberger, supra note 31. The TRIPS Agreement does not
adopt the neighboring rights provisions of the Rome Convention, which in some
cases, may be stronger than TRIPS regulations. The United States is not a member
of the Rome Convention, however, so it is only subject to the TRIPS provisions.
When countries that are members of both TRIPS and the Rome Convention deal
with countries that are only bound by TRIPS, they will not apply Rome Convention
principles to their proceedings. See Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 74.
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1. In respect of a fixation of their performance on a phonogram, per-
formers shall have the possibility of preventing the following acts
when undertaken without their authorization: the fixation of their un-
fixed performance and the reproduction of such fixation. Performers
shall also have the possibility of preventing the following acts when
undertaken without their authorization: the broadcasting by wireless
means and the communication to the public of their live performance.
2. Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right to authorize or pro-
hibit the direct or indirect reproduction of their phonograms.1
5 9
Unless contracting nations desire an explicit mention of
online activities, this provision appears to establish clearly the
illegality of free online music sharing.160 Nevertheless, the inef-
ficiencies and shortcomings of TRIPS lie in its theory of nation-
alism and its purported methods of enforcement.
1. The Territory Principle
Article 1 of the TRIPS agreement sets out the "Nature and
Scope of Obligations" under the Agreement:
1. Members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement.
Members may, but shall not be obliged to, implement in their domestic
law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement,
provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of
this Agreement. Members shall be free to determine the appropriate
method of implementing the provisions of this Agreement within their
own legal system and practice.
3. Members shall accord the treatment provided for in this Agreement
to the nationals of other Members. 1 6 1 In respect of the relevant intel-
lectual property right, the nationals of other Members shall be under-
stood as those natural or legal persons that would meet the criteria for
eligibility for protection provided for in the Paris Convention (1967),
the Berne Convention (1971), the Rome Convention and the Treaty on
Intellectual Property in Respect of Integrated Circuits, were all Mem-
159. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 14.
160. Of course, Napster had not been invented at the time the TRIPS Agreement
was enacted, so it is impractical to expect the Agreement to have included a specific
mention of P2P activities.
161. The TRIPS Agreement includes a footnote after this sentence, which states
that "when 'nationals' are referred to in this Agreement, they shall be deemed, in the
case of a separate customs territory Member of the WTO, to mean persons, natural
or legal, who are domiciled or who have a real and effective industrial or commercial
establishment in that customs territory." TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 1
n. 1.
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bers of the WTO members of those conventions .... 162
Article 3 of the TRIPS Agreement deals with how member
nations must treat other member nations who allegedly violate
the hosting country's specific copyright laws: 163
1. Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treat-
ment no less favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with
regard to the protection of intellectual property .... In respect of per-
formers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organizations, this
obligation only applies in respect of the rights provided under this
Agreement .... 164
Moreover, Article 4 of the Agreement establishes that any
"advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member
to the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immedi-
ately and unconditionally to the nationals of all other Mem-
bers."165 Accordingly, some countries, if they wish, may choose
to enact more stringent standards than those set out in copy-
right or neighboring rights treaties. The purpose of most-
favored-nation treatment, however, is to prevent discrimination
against other foreign-rights holders. 166 Of course, most nations,
including the United States, do not have tendencies to produce
copyright law regimes that show preference for foreign nation-
als, so international agreements are the natural source for
equalizing the treatment of all copyright infringers within a
specific nation's borders. 167 In addition, the concept of borders is
also vaguer in an international digital commons, and many ex-
perts are concerned about the practicality and possible success
of attempting to implement such borders. 168
The TRIPS Agreement treatment of nationals also reflects
the territoriality principle, which holds that a state has no com-
162. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 1.
163. Katzenberger notes, however, that some exceptions may apply under Arti-
cle 3, such as those exceptions that were already laid down in the Berne Convention,
certain retaliatory measures available under Article 6, and certain procedural dis-
crepancies that may occur due to the existence of international defendants. See
Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 74. The problem of U.S. personal jurisdiction juris-
prudence is one example. See supra notes 107-47 and accompanying text.
164. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 3.
165. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 4.
166. See Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 75 (citing JOSEF DREXL, Entwick-
lungsmoglichkeiten des Urheberrechts im Rahmen des GATT: IN
LANDERBEHANDLUNG, MEISTBEGONSTIGUNG, MAXIMALSCHUTZ: EINE
PRINZIPIENORIENTIERTE BETRACHTUNG IM LICHTE BESTEHENDER KONVENTIONEN 10-
11 (Muinchener Universitaitsschriften.; Reihe der Juristischen Fakultat, 1990)).
167. See id.
168. Scully, supra note 6, at 321.
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petence to enact regulations governing activities occurring out-
side its borders. 16 9 Still, every country is required to provide the
same protection under its domestic laws to both domestic and
foreign defendants. 170 The territoriality principle responds to
two needs. 171 The first principle is the need for national sover-
eignty. 172 Most countries are more willing to agree to the terms
of treaties when they are able to retain control over the viola-
tions that occur within their borders. 173 The second principle is
the promotion of international commerce through certainty in
investment-backed expectations. 174 Countries will be less likely
to engage in international business if they are subject to stricter
copyright laws than they would be in their own or another more
lax country's jurisdiction. 175 Historically, territoriality has been
the dominating norm of international copyright cases. 176 Harold
Maier describes the modern concept of territoriality as follows:
"acts of foreign sovereigns should, when appropriate, be given
effect within another state's territory ... "177
The primary concern surrounding the territoriality princi-
ple is that it presents no agreement on worldwide substantive
rights.178 Although some common ground may be found in the
substantive provisions of international copyright treaties, most
of the fundamental police controls and enforcement measures
169. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63; see INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW, supra note 11, at 231. The TRIPS Agreement incorporates territo-
rial concepts from the Paris and Berne Conventions, and bears similarity to compa-
rable premises in the GATT. Id. at 232. Goldstein even classifies the TRIPS
Agreement as being "backward looking." Id. at 237.
170. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 11, at 231; see
also Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 72-73.
171. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63.
172. Id.
173. Id. Goldstein uses this example: "[Flor State A to impose copyright liability
on conduct occurring in State B might be viewed by State B as an attack on its sov-
ereignty, particularly if its own law excused the same conduct from copyright liabil-
ity." Id.; see INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 1, at 231.
174. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at 63.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 64-65 (citing EUGEN ULMER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 13-14 (1978), Gyorgy Boytha, Some Private International
Law Aspects of the Protection of Authors' Rights, 24 COPYRIGHT 399 (1988)).
177. Harold G. Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Intersec-
tion Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 282
(1982). Conduct that occurs outside a country may also be subject to that country's
jurisdiction if that activity will have a substantial effect inside the country.
178. INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 11, at 231. In
addition, for an interesting look at some limited exceptions to the most-favored-
nation treatment regime, see Katzenberger, supra note 31, at 77.
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are left to individual countries to decide. 179 Some theorists are
beginning to attack the territoriality concept, though many
countries are unwilling to relinquish their sovereignty over es-
sential intellectual property decisions for a variety of economic
reasons. 180 Intellectual property experts like Doris Estelle Long
claim that treaty approaches centering on territorial controls
will not adequately manage the expanding reach of the Internet,
because of the possibility for widespread violations.18'
2. Enforcement of Rights
The primary problem with the national treatment practice
seems to be that there is no guarantee that countries will have
rules in place to adequately protect against Internet music shar-
ing. Consequently, developed countries like the United States
are now also demanding extra-territorial protection for their
works.' 8 2 As Thomas Dreier emphasizes, "it is not enough sim-
ply to grant world-wide substantive protection at a sufficiently
high level; rather, it is necessary to create measures for the en-
forcement in practice of the substantive protection at this
level." 18 3 Because it is primarily an area dominated by the mu-
sic industry of America, other countries may be unwilling to fo-
cus their energies on this admittedly centralized problem that
has limited consequences for their own citizens other than the
censorship of free-flowing information.
Part III of the TRIPS Agreement governs the enforcement
of substantive rights. The composition of this section was con-
troversial and precarious, because the framers of the agreement
were attempting to balance the need for unrestricted trade in
goods and services with effective means for protecting against
179. See INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, supra note 11, at 231.
180. See id. at 231-32. The author uses this example:
[The] Nike company wanted to have its trademark attached to the clothing
worn by Olympic athletes in Barcelona in 1992. A Spanish claimant had
previously registered the name "Nike" as a trademark in Spain and sued to
prevent the Nike Company from using the same in Barcelona. National
treatment results in subjecting Nike to prior registration in Spain, just as
it would any Spanish national. But should this purely territorial priority
preclude disseminating a trademark worldwide? That was, in any event,
where Nike wanted its mark televised from the Olympics.
Id.
181. See id. at 232-33.
182. See id. at 270-71.
183. Dreier, supra note 36, at 249.
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intellectual property violations.18 4 Arguably, the ultimate in-
adequacy that resulted from this balancing act is that the lan-
guage of Part III, Section 1, is ineffectual and ambiguous. For
example, Paragraph 2 of Article 41 states, "Procedures concern-
ing the enforcement of intellectual property rights shall be fair
and equitable. They shall not be unnecessarily complicated or
costly, or entail unreasonable time-limits or unwarranted de-
lays."'1 5 Or, as Paragraph 5 states,
It is understood that this Part does not create any obligation to put in
place a judicial system for the enforcement of intellectual property
rights distinct from that for the enforcement of laws in general, nor
does it affect the capacity of Members to enforce their laws in general.
Nothing in this Part creates any obligation with respect to the distri-
bution of resources as between enforcement of intellectual property
rights and the enforcement of the law in general.'
8 6
Part III, Section 2 does provide for some basic procedural
requirements, like the right to legal representation, the neces-
sity of production of proof, the ability to request injunctions or
damages, and the right to indemnification. 8 7 Still, if countries
are not actively policing the copyright infringement occurring
within their boundaries, then none of those basic legal provi-
sions will have any force whatsoever.188
Specifically, the United States confronts the problem that
although infringing countries may be violating copyright privi-
leges of U.S. producers under U.S. laws in a variety of cases, the
infringing nation has no similar laws of its own.18 9 For example,
some Middle Eastern countries have no copyright protections in
184. Id. at 254. Dreier states that an attempt was made to construct a "mini-
mum basic stock of procedural regulations" that he believes reflected a certain An-
glo-American pragmatism that does not always mix with Continental-European con-
cepts of formal procedural fairness. Id. at 255. He also notes that it remains
undecided as to which developing countries were not adequately represented
throughout the TRIPS negotiations, but that it is clear that industrialized nations
were primarily in control. Id. at 257; see also INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 328.
185. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, art. 41 (emphasis added).
186. Id., art. 41.
187. Id., arts. 42-48.
188. The World Intellectual Property Organization agrees that lack of more
-stringent enforcement measures can be an immense problem in adequately protect-
ing against copyright infringement. For an interesting discussion of both draft legis-
lation for stronger standards, and for a description of further international conven-
tions dealing with those problems, see INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 329.
189. Id. at 453.
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place. 190 In addition, countries like Malaysia and Indonesia only
provide foreign works with protection if they are published in
their country within thirty days of being published abroad. 19 1
Another conflicting pressure is that the first sentence of the
TRIPS Agreement explicitly states that although vigilant pro-
tection of intellectual property rights is necessary to maintain-
ing economic viability in most cases, the Agreement was also
enacted to "ensure that measures and procedures to enforce in-
tellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to
legitimate trade."192  Still, this desire to stimulate the unfet-
tered transfer of goods is not given the same priority that it was
given in the 1947 GATT, where freedom of international trade
was clearly the overriding concern. 193 The preamble to other
similar intellectual property agreements often reflects a similar
tension; for example, the WTO Agreement states in its preamble
that contracting nations will seek further agreements that con-
stitute "reciprocal and mutually advantageous arrangements di-
rected to the substantial reduction of tariffs and other barriers
to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations."1 94
D. TRADE CONSEQUENCES-SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT
Even though the interest in encouraging trade is strong,195
the lack of support for stronger copyright enforcement has
caused the United States and some European countries to initi-
ate trade sanctions. 196 One accepted strategy for persuading
other countries to abide by U.S. copyright standards involves
imposing trade sanctions against countries that violate our
copyright standards, while simultaneously applying political
pressure to their leaders and offering education on our poli-
190. Id. Some countries also do not provide protection for newer forms of ex-
pression, like computer software and semiconductor chips. Id.
191. Id.
192. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 29, preamble.
193. Katzenberger & Kur, supra note 12, at 5-6 (citing General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194).
194. See WTO Agreement, preamble.
195. Katzenberger & Kur, supra note 12, at 16-17. The authors note that the
United States sometimes hesitates to immediately impose trade policy retaliation
measures under § 301 due to political pressures. Id.
196. RIAA, RL4A Praises Administration for its Stand Against Copyright Piracy
in Foreign Markets: Annual Government Report Detailing Deficiencies of IP Protec-
tion in Foreign Markets Issued, RECORDING INDUS. ASS'N OF AM. PRESS ROOM, May
1, 2003, available at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/05O1O3.asp.
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cies. 197 Section 301 directs the President to "take all ... appro-
priate and feasible action" to enforce United States rights in
trade agreements. 198 On May 1, 2003, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive Robert Zoellick released his Special 301 Report published
under the Act detailing the inadequacy and ineffectiveness of in-
tellectual property protection in seventy-four different nations
around the world.199
The 2003 report placed specific emphasis on the growing is-
sue of counterfeiting and piracy in most nations across the
globe, with focus on Internet copyright infringement.200 The re-
port contended that the reason for unacceptably high levels of
piracy and counterfeiting of U.S. intellectual property is that
certain countries have not fulfilled the necessary implementa-
tion of TRIPS enforcement provisions. 201 Nations that threaten
U.S. intellectual property rights are placed into priority catego-
ries.20 2 For example, in 2003, Ukraine was identified as the
highest priority because of its repeated failure to take effective
action against significant levels of optical media piracy and its
lack of adequate intellectual property laws in general. 203 Many
other countries, including, but not limited to, China, Italy, Bra-
zil, Taiwan, and Belarus, were also identified for their failure to
comply with U.S. intellectual property demands. 204 All of the
countries listed on the report are described as having inefficient
or imprecise copyright enforcement measures. 20 5
Section 301 rebuts the presumption that strong intellectual
property rights and methods of enforcement aid all countries,
regardless of their status of development, because if that were
true, more countries would be working to protect against the in-
tellectual property violations that the United States has been
experiencing. 20 6 All of the countries that are refusing to actively
police the copyright infringement occurring within their borders
197. See Koss, supra note 39, at 96.
198. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(a)(1) (2000). See Koss, supra note 39, at 96.
199. ROBERT ZOELLICK, 2003 SPECIAL 301 REPORT, 1 (2003), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document Library[Reports-Publications/2003/2003-Spec
ial_301_Reportasset -uploadfile665_6124.pdf. See RIAA, supra note 196, available
at http://www.riaa.com/news/newsletter/050103.asp.
200. ZOELLICK, supra note 199, at 1.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 10-32.
205. Id. at 10-42.
206. See id.; see also RIAA, supra note 196, available at http://www.riaa.com/
newslnewsletter/050103.asp.
MINN. J GLOBAL TRADE
are likely doing so for a reason.207 For example, China has re-
peatedly neglected to enforce the copyright protections that the
United States has attempted to institute.208 Trademark coun-
terfeiting, unauthorized production and sale of copyrighted
products and piracy of U.S. books has continued unabated.209
Freedom of access to goods and services is a value that many
foreign nationals covet, and little to no thought may be given to
the foreign copyright holder-living somewhere across the
globe-who is not financially benefiting from the use of that
creation. Moreover, the United States is viewed as a prosperous
superpower by many nations of the world, so its desire to retain
absolute control over the revenue of its intellectual property is
understandably not the top priority of many impoverished and
developing nations.210 The infusion of better quality products or
entertainment sources at low cost is likely more of a perceived
benefit than a threat to such struggling economies.
Nevertheless, the trade sanctions wielded in the past by the
United States have worked in several cases, 21 1 so it is possible
that further sanctioning efforts may serve to combat the free
market pressures of developing nations. Still, until the global
economy is more equally proportioned, it is unlikely that the
majority of other foreign countries will be as concerned with the
possibility of copyright infringement as the United States will
undoubtedly remain. This imbalance may result in further
complications to the U.S. effort to restrain online music sharing
worldwide.
CONCLUSION
Recent history has proven that international demand for
the P2P music-sharing format is insatiable. To complicate mat-
ters, technology has met and surpassed every barrier that the
music industry or the legal system has attempted to put in the
P2P format's path. Furthermore, the speed and ease with which
citizens can obtain digital media and information online has
207. See INTRODUCTION TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 7, at 329.
208. ZOELLICK, supra note 199, at 10-11.
209. Id.
210. In addition, some conservative economists believe that a products market
unfettered by intellectual property rights would attain greater efficiency than at
present. See id.
211. See id. at 33-41.
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drastically altered society's conception of propriety, entitlement,
and ownership, which has also subsequently contributed to the
music sharing revolution.
The United States and other similarly invested nations will
persist in attempting to control the chaos; however, problems in
policing private citizens' anonymous Internet activities and in-
adequacies in enforcing existing laws will continue to thwart
those efforts. Specific deficiencies in personal jurisdiction law in
the United States and insubstantial provisions in the interna-
tional TRIPS Agreement will contribute to the impenetrability
of the P2P music-sharing format. Hence, U.S. courts must ag-
gressively revamp personal jurisdiction over Internet interac-
tions in order to curb music sharing. In addition, WIPO should
amend the TRIPS Agreement by supplementing the current
provisions with more substantial, cohesive methods for policing
Internet activities, and by mandating stronger enforcement
measures that can truly aid in preventing copyright infringe-
ment.212 In order for those enforcement measures to be effec-
tive, they must be uniformly stringent, while still allowing some
flexibility for national autonomy. Consequently, a completely
new paradigm may be the necessary solution. An innovative,
expedient, uncompromising, and unified global effort will be
necessary to ensure the success of any strategy.
212. One of WIPO's primary responsibilities is to enact new legislation that
adapts existing provisions to new technologies and reflects emerging consensus for
increasing the level of protection on rights in general. See INTRODUCTION TO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE, supra note 7, at 335.
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